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This study investigated whether peer-nominated prosocial and antisocial children 
have different perceptions of the motives underlying peers‟ prosocial actions. Eighty-
seven children, aged 10- to 12-years-old, completed peer-nomination measures of 
social behaviour. On the basis of numbers of social nominations received, a 
subsample of fifty-one children (thirty-three who were peer-nominated as „prosocial‟, 
and eighteen who were peer-nominated as „antisocial‟) then recorded their perceptions 
of peers‟ motives for prosocial behaviours. Expressed motives were categorised 
predominantly into three categories coinciding with Turiel‟s (1978) „moral‟, 
„conventional‟, and „personal domains‟. Results indicate that children‟s social 
reputation is associated with the extent to which they perceive peers‟ prosocial 
motives as „personal‟ or „moral‟, with more prosocial children attributing moral 
motives, and more antisocial children attributing personal motives. Although 
traditionally Turiel‟s domain theory has been used to understand „antisocial’ 
children‟s behaviour, the current findings suggest that „prosocial’ children‟s 
behaviour may also be related to domains of judgment. 
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Prosocial and antisocial children’s perceptions of peers’ prosocial motives  
Understanding how to promote prosocial behaviour in childhood is an 
important task for developmental psychology. In seeking a definition of prosocial 
behaviour, it must be recognised that prosocial behaviour may be enacted for different 
reasons, such as to achieve egoistic outcomes, ostensibly beneficial to the actor, or 
altruistic outcomes, ostensibly beneficial to others. Here, we adopt the definition used 
by Grusec, Davidov and Lundell (2002: 458), as „any intentional action that produces 
a positive or beneficial outcome for the recipient regardless of whether that action is 
costly to the donor, neutral in its impact, or beneficial‟.  
 As children grow older, prosocial behaviours become more important in terms 
of affiliation and social influence, while coercive and antisocial behaviours are 
tolerated less by their peer group (Hawley, 1999). The relative absence of prosocial 
behaviour, coupled with the presence of aggression, results in rejection by peers 
(Denham, McKinley, Couchoud, & Holt, 1990; Volling, MacKinnon-Lewis, Rabiner, 
& Baradaran, 1993), often leading to more frequent negative social interactions in 
adolescence (Dishion, Patterson, Stoolmiller, & Skinner, 1991; Kupersmidt & Coie, 
1990; Tremblay, LeBlanc, & Schwartzman, 1988; Hay, Castle, Davies, Demetriou, & 
Stimson, 1999). In addition, interventions (such as Social Skills Training) can reduce 
levels of aggression while leaving levels of prosocial behaviour unchanged (Nangle, 
Erdley, Carpenter, & Newman, 2002), highlighting that the processes underpinning 
prosocial and antisocial behaviours are distinct. Since behaviour in social situations is 
often based upon children‟s latent knowledge structures (Crick & Dodge, 1994) we 
sought to clarify prosocial and antisocial children‟s understanding of the motives 
underpinning peers‟ prosocial behaviour.  
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Knowing that something is „right‟ or „wrong‟ does not always elicit the „right‟ 
or „moral‟ course of action. Eisenberg (1986) claims that children who have 
developed the capacity to reason about what is „right‟ may not necessarily choose to 
engage in prosocial behaviour because of, for example, a lack of motivation, the 
required skills, or adequate assertiveness. Furthermore, children‟s reasoning in 
different contexts, or relating to different concerns (for instance, egoistic or altruistic), 
may influence their subsequent prosocial behaviour (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998). 
Developmental stage theories have been highly influential in informing our 
view of how children at various stages of development engage in reasoning and make 
social judgments. A helpful elaboration to this framework may be provided by 
Turiel‟s (1978) theory of domains of social judgment. Turiel (1978), and subsequently 
Nucci (1981), have demonstrated that when children make judgments about peers‟ 
negative social behaviours, they use consistent criteria in order to distinguish between 
categories of social knowledge (i.e., moral, conventional and personal) which 
motivate those behaviours. Children‟s domains of social judgment (Turiel, 1978) were 
investigated to address the concern that social competence as applied to aggressive 
behaviour tends to view such behaviour as „value-free‟ and that moral issues, such as 
fairness and regard for others‟ welfare, have been ignored (Arsenio & Lemerise, 
2001). In addition, domains of social judgement link convincingly with other concepts 
associated with pro- and antisocial behaviour (e.g., Machiavellianism, see Sutton & 
Keogh, 2000). 
 Turiel (1978) claims that moral judgments are seen to be obligatory, and not 
contingent on social or cultural rules. Judgments made in the moral domain are 
concerned with issues of welfare, justice, and rights. An example of a judgement in 
the moral domain might be that actions such as inflicting hurt, or the act of murder, 
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for example, is always wrong, but consideration for the welfare of others is right, as it 
has the potential for positive outcomes. The moral domain involves actions which 
have inherently negative or positive outcomes. Context-dependent conventional 
judgments, on the other hand, are linked to existing accepted social arrangements, 
and, as such, are more arbitrary than moral judgments, since conventional actions do 
not involve inherently negative outcomes. An example of a judgment made in the 
conventional domain might be that it is not acceptable for a pupil to address his or her 
teacher on first name terms. It may be accepted convention for children to call their 
teachers by their surnames, but, even if children addressed their teachers by first 
names, there would be no inherently negative outcomes. By way of contrast, it is not 
possible to commit murder without causing inherent harm (Nucci, 2001).  
Elaborating Turiel‟s theory, Nucci (1981; 2001) has highlighted the existence 
of „personal‟ judgments as those which are neither morally obligatory nor socially 
expected. Nucci (2001: 54) defines personal judgments as those which the „individual 
considers to pertain primarily to oneself, and therefore, to be outside the area of 
justifiable social regulation‟. The following examples may help to illustrate judgments 
made in the personal domain: the decision as to who would be one‟s best friends; or 
the decision to wear one‟s hair in a particular style; or the decision made by a college 
student to leave college, before completing his course, in order to pursue his own 
professional sports career, despite knowing that the college sports team depended on 
him for their only chance of success (Nucci, 2001; Turiel, 2002). According to Nucci 
(2001), the ability to make such personal choices is an important element in the 
identification of one‟s individuality, or social uniqueness, and in the development of 
the individual‟s sense of agency and autonomy. Importantly, the facility to develop a 
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personal domain of privacy and discretion is necessary for healthy psychological 
growth (Nucci, 2001). 
 A fundamental concept of Turiel‟s (1978) theory is that children are able to 
make distinctions between domains of judgement: individuals derive social 
knowledge from their experiences, and they subsequently form conceptual systems 
which help them to interpret their varied social experiences. Turiel‟s (1978) theory 
does embrace developmental change in individuals‟ reasoning within the domains, but 
this change is of secondary importance to the existence of the domains themselves. 
It has been further demonstrated (Nucci, 1981; Turiel, 1978) that individuals‟ 
negative behaviours in social situations are based on the judgments which they make 
in these three domains of social judgment. This being the case, similar categories of 
social knowledge (i.e., moral, conventional, and personal) may also underpin positive 
behaviours (Smetana, Bridgeman, & Turiel, 1983). It has also been argued that an 
investigation into children‟s understanding of the ways in which actions are related to 
domains of judgment may provide an insight into the motivation behind children‟s 
prosocial behaviour (Smetana et al., 1983).  
When considering effective social understanding, communication, and 
functioning, the ability to understand that other individuals have thoughts, or a „mind‟ 
separate from one‟s own, is fundamental (Wellman, 1990; Baron-Cohen, 1995; 
Astington, 1996). However, the relationship between psychological understanding 
and social interaction is a complex one and the ability to interpret the thoughts and 
needs of others does not necessarily result in prosocial behaviour. Indeed, most 
children will engage in both prosocial and antisocial behaviour to a greater or lesser 
extent.  
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In fact, a mature theory of mind may enable individuals to manipulate others 
for their own purposes (Sutton, Smith, & Swettenham, 1999). However, it has also 
been shown that peer- nominated prosocial children have greater perspective-taking 
capacity than bullies (Warden & Mackinnon, 2003). This finding suggests that 
children who demonstrate prosocial behaviour, and those who demonstrate antisocial 
behaviour, may differ in how they interpret the behaviours of others. Antisocial 
behaviour typically reflects direct and indirect aggressive actions, delinquent 
behaviour, and externalising (Crozier, Dodge, Fontaine, Lansford, Bates, Pettit, & 
Levenson, 2008; Warden, Cheyne, Christie, Fitzpatrick, & Reid, 2003). Children 
exhibiting such behaviour, especially aggression, tend to attribute hostile intent to 
peers‟ ambiguous actions (Dodge, 1980; Dodge & Frame, 1982; Erdley & Asher, 
1996). This may reflect an understanding of the world where people are perceived to 
act for selfish or personal reasons rather than a view of the world which ascribes 
moral or conventional motives to the behaviours of others. Such an interpretation is 
given weight by Sutton and Keogh‟s (2000) findings that bullies have high 
Machiavellian scores, characterised by the manipulation of others for personal gain. 
Whether this extends to their interpretation of peer prosocial behaviours is at present 
unknown.  
In contrast, prosocial behaviour involves acting in ways which will result in 
positive outcomes for others. Prosocial children are less likely than neutral children 
(i.e., children who are neither particularly prosocial nor antisocial) to attribute hostile 
intent to provocation by peers; rather, prosocial children are more likely to 
demonstrate a „benign attributional bias‟, giving peers the benefit of the doubt in 
potentially provocative situations (Nelson & Crick, 1999). Processing such as this 
may be characteristic of children who think that others act in accordance with moral 
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or conventional rules, not only in provocative situations but also when actions are 
intended to have a positive outcome for others.   
Theory relating to children‟s social information processing posits that children 
process social information through a series of steps which involve encoding and 
interpreting cues, clarifying one‟s goals, deciding on how to respond to cues, and 
evaluating potential alternative responsive behaviours (Crick & Dodge, 1994).  
It seems apparent that some children engage in positive behaviour towards 
others with the intention of manipulating them for selfish reasons. For instance, 
Sutton and Keogh (2000) have shown that aggressive children who display bullying 
behaviour and have high Machiavellian scores, are characterised by manipulative 
behaviour which serves their own purposes. Arsenio and Fleiss (1996) posit that 
proactively aggressive children lack the understanding that hurting others for personal 
gain is morally wrong, while MRI data from conduct disordered adolescents suggests 
that these young people may actually enjoy seeing victims in pain (Decety, 
Michalska, Akitsuki, & Lahey, 2009). In a related vein, Menesini, Sanchez, Fonzi, 
Ortega, Costabile and Lo Feudo (2003) demonstrated that, compared with victims, 
bullies have a higher level of disengagement emotions and motives. Specifically, 
bullies showed high levels of egocentric disengagement, i.e., the bullies stressed 
positive personal advantages to be gained from bullying behaviour, and denied or 
distorted the consequences for the victim. Menesini et al. (2003) also reported that 
bullies appear to encounter some difficulty in perspective-taking in some situations.  
Applying the domain model of motives, described above, to these types of 
antisocial behaviour, it appears that antisocial behaviour may be undertaken for 
personal, or selfish, rather than moral or conventional reasons. Given that aggressive 
children exhibit chronic biases in their patterns of social information processing 
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(Arsenio & Lemerise, 2001; Harvey, Fletcher, & French, 2001) we sought to examine 
whether the processing of social interactions as falling within the personal domain 
dominates antisocial children‟s cognitions relating to prosocial as well as antisocial 
behaviour. Therefore, one aim of the current study was to investigate one relevant 
question which to date seems unexplored, i.e., whether the perception of others‟ 
motives for prosocial behaviour is affected by one‟s own prosocial or antisocial 
status. Antisocial
1
 and prosocial children may have different motivations for engaging 
in prosocial behaviour. Because of the importance of effective peer social interaction 
in preventing maladaptive behaviour (e.g., Dishion et al. 1991; Kupersmidt & Coie, 
1990; Tremblay et al., 1988; Hay et al. 1999), it is necessary to understand that some 
children may demonstrate antisocial behaviour as a result of misinterpreting 
underlying social cues.  
Addressing this issue allows us empirically to integrate social domain theory 
with social information processing perspectives on children‟s behaviour. This 
enhances the latter by addressing concerns relating to the „value-free‟ nature of 
processing within that model (Arsenio & Lemerise, 2001). This study also brings 
fresh insights for social domain theory by examining it in relation to the perceptions 
of both prosocial and antisocial children. This understanding would also have 
practical implications for interventions designed to minimise children‟s negative 
behaviour. Specifically, results may inform CBT-type approaches to intervention (see 
Durlak, 1995) by highlighting attributions that may limit the extent to which positive 
behaviour is engaged in. 
 In the study of children‟s prosocial motives, one important area of 
investigation is the relationship between children‟s own behaviour and their 
perceptions of peers‟ prosocial behaviours. It may be the case that children who 
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behave prosocially and antisocially have differing perceptions about peers‟ prosocial 
behaviour. On the basis of evidence that the social behaviour of aggressive children 
may be manipulative and selfishly-motivated (Sutton & Keogh, 2000), it may be 
predicted that peer-nominated prosocial and antisocial children attribute differing 
motives to peers‟ behaviour. 
Aims and Hypotheses 
The aim of the current study was to examine whether the extent to which 
children engage in prosocial and antisocial behaviour is associated with their 
perceptions of the motives for peers‟ prosocial behaviour. On the basis of peer-
nominations of prosocial and antisocial behaviour, prosocial and antisocial children 
took part in a computer task designed to assess their perceptions of the motives of 
other children involved in prosocial interactions. The possible motives suggested were 
related to aspects of Turiel‟s (1978) and Nucci‟s (1981) categories of social judgment, 
i.e., moral, conventional, and personal. 
Aggressive children have been shown to access information from underlying 
social reasoning domains differently from their prosocial peers (e.g., Harvey et al., 
2001). In the light of this finding, and also that aggressive children are inclined to 
display Machiavellian tendencies (e.g., Sutton & Keogh, 2000), and are therefore 
concerned with their own needs rather than the needs of others, we predicted that 
antisocial behaviour would be positively related to the identification of personal 
motives for peers‟ prosocial behaviour. In contrast, because prosocial children show a 
tendency to view peers‟ behaviour through „rose-colored glasses‟ (Nelson & Crick, 
1999), and give others the benefit of the doubt in provocative situations, it was also 
predicted that children with high prosocial scores would be more likely to ascribe 




Eighty-seven children (aged 11 years, 1 month to 12 years, 1 month; mean age 
11 years, 6 months) from five same-level classes in three large suburban primary 
schools in West Central Scotland took part in peer nominations (see below). This 
sample comprised 50 boys and 37 girls. The schools were non-denominational and 
were maintained by the local authority. Permission was given by the local authority, 
head teachers of the schools involved, and by the children‟s parents or carers. On the 
basis of the peer nominations, a sub-sample of fifty-one children (24 boys and 27 
girls) was identified. As children from different classes were involved, it was 
necessary to develop a standardisation method to take account of nomination 
frequency variations between classes. Ratings for the two behaviour categories, 
prosocial and antisocial, were therefore standardised across the sample and within 
individual classes, so that each child had a z-score indicating his or her position 
within the sample and a z-score indicating his or her position within the class. To be 
assigned to either category, children had to satisfy both parts of one of the following 
criteria: 
A. (1) A z-score of .5 or more for sample ratings, and  
      (2) A z-score of above zero within their class 
B. (1) A z-score of .5 or more for class ratings, and 
      (2) A z-score of above zero within the sample  
Criterion A1 ensures that children who have overall extreme scores are selected, 
while Criterion A2 ensures that, in classes where the level of scores awarded is high 
for all pupils and scales, only those in the top half of the class are selected. Criterion 
B1 ensures that children who have high scores within a class are selected, but would, 
 12 
by itself, produce an equal proportion of prosocial and antisocial children in each 
class. Therefore, Criterion B2 ensures that pupils are only selected if their scores were 
in the top half of the sample. The combined use of these criteria ensures that children 
who have extreme prosocial or antisocial scores are allocated to the appropriate 
groups, but that any wide variation in scores across classes is taken into account 
(adapted from Warden, Cheyne, et al., 2003). 
Materials 
Peer nominations of prosocial and antisocial behaviour. All participants 
completed the Prosocial and Antisocial subscales of the Child Social Behaviour 
Questionnaire (CSBQ: Warden, Christie et al., 2003). Each subscale comprised eight 
items, with prosocial items tapping helping (e.g., helping with schoolwork), sharing 
(e.g., sharing snack with a child who has none), caring (e.g., being nice to a child who 
was sad or unhappy) and inclusion (e.g., sticking up for a child who was in trouble) 
behaviours, and antisocial items tapping physical (e.g., hitting or kicking another 
child) and verbal abuse (e.g., calling another child nasty names), delinquent (e.g., 
breaking another child‟s things) and rejecting behaviours (e.g., stopping another child 
from joining in a game) (Warden, Christie et al., 2003). In the current study, these two 
subscales demonstrated good internal reliability (Cronbach‟s alpha = .90 and .93 
respectively). On each participant‟s questionnaire there appeared a random selection 
of ten male and female classmates‟ names. The lists of names presented were rotated 
across the participants to allow for each child‟s name being available for nomination 
10 times for each of the 16 behaviours indicated.  
Perceptions of peer prosocial motives. Through the use of „Easy PHP‟ (2005) 
and „Notepad‟ (2005), a computer program was developed and loaded on a laptop. 
The program was devised to gather data on the children‟s perceptions of the motives 
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underlying a range of children‟s prosocial behaviours. The program involved a series 
of line-drawn pictures, accompanied by short written explanations (adapted from 
Warden & Christie, 1997). 
Two series of sixteen pictures were presented, one for boys, depicting boys 
behaving prosocially toward other boys, and one for girls, depicting girls behaving 
prosocially toward other girls. Same-sex only scenarios were presented deliberately to 
avoid attribution of „romantic‟ motives (c.f. Greener & Crick, 1999). Each series 
comprised four examples of each of the four prosocial behaviours of caring, inclusion, 
helping and sharing. The four examples of prosocial behaviour appeared in 
randomized order across each type of behaviour. Each series was preceded by the 
same four warm-up pictures which were designed to provide the participants with 
practice in using the seven-point likert scale. 
The pictures were constructed so that, on the laptop screen, participants would 
be able to rate the likelihood of each of three motives, i.e. moral, conventional, or 
personal, as being the motive underlying the behaviour shown in each of the sixteen 
pictures. Underneath each of the sixteen pictures a short statement described the 
behaviour depicted in the picture, for example “Todd is a new boy at school. Billy is 
showing him the way to the dinner hall”. Beneath each of these descriptions, three 
sentences were presented in random order, each with a corresponding seven-point 
likert scale. Each of the three sentences provided a motive of the actor in the picture, 
and were representative of considerations relating to the moral (e.g., “I feel sorry for 
Todd because he’s a new boy at school and doesn’t know the way to the dinner hall”), 
conventional (e.g., “We’ve been told that we should help new children in school”), 
and personal (e.g., “I want Todd to like me”) domains. These scales had good 
reliability:.92 for both moral and conventional motives, and .96 for personal motives. 
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Due to the constraints imposed by the computer program used, the scenarios were 
presented in the same order to all participants.  
Procedure 
Phase 1: Peer Nominations. Children were tested in small groups of four or 
six and it was explained that the purpose of the research was to investigate patterns of 
social behaviour, both positive and negative, by children towards others. Children 
were reminded that they did not have to take part in the activity, and that they were 
able to withdraw from the task if they wished. None chose to withdraw. Each child 
was then given his (her) own copy of the amended CSBQ, on which appeared the list 
of ten classmates‟ names. The children were reassured that all their responses would 
be confidential to the researcher alone, and they were then asked to indicate, next to 
the names on his (her) CSBQ, whether they had ever seen that child engaging in the 
range of behaviours described. They were instructed to indicate the frequency of their 
peers‟ observed behaviour („never‟, „sometimes‟, or „often‟). „Sometimes‟ was 
defined as one to three occasions; „often‟ was defined as on more than three 
occasions. It was specified that these sightings should have taken place during this 
term, and all within the school. When all the participants had completed the CSBQ 
task, the numbers of prosocial and antisocial peer nominations each child received 
were collated. 
 Phase 2: Perceptions of peer prosocial motives. Two weeks after the peer 
nomination process, the sub-sample of 51 children were withdrawn individually from 
their classes to a quiet area where the researcher explained the computer task, and the 
use of the likert scale, again stressing that responses were confidential. It was 
explained that the program consisted of four warm-up items and sixteen experimental 
items. For each warm-up item, the child would see a picture, underneath which was 
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written a sentence explaining the action taking place in the picture. Underneath this 
there would be an additional, smaller, picture of one of the characters. This smaller 
picture would show „thought bubbles‟ coming from the character‟s head. Beside this 
there would be written three possible „thoughts‟, each of which could be potentially 
attributed to the character: it was explained these thoughts were related to the reason 
behind the behaviour shown in the picture. It was explained that the four warm-up 
items would help the child gain practice in using a seven-point type-type scale. The 
child was then shown how to start the program, and the researcher watched while the 
child worked through the four warm-up items. Following completion of the warm-up 
items, the researcher moved to another part of the room in order to give the child 
privacy to complete the task. Instructed by on-screen prompts, each child then worked 
through the experimental program consisting of sixteen items. The participants 
indicated the likelihood of each motive by clicking on the relevant point on the likert 
scale. 
Children were assigned a Moral score, a Conventional score and a Personal 
score, depending on how they had rated these three motives for all the scenarios 
presented. There were sixteen scenarios, so possible scores for each motive ranged 
from 16 to 112. 
Results 
Our aim was to investigate whether the extent to which children were 
prosocial or antisocial predicted Moral, Conventional, and Personal domain scores. 
To assess this, we used hierarchical, multiple regression. This was to examine the 
effects of prosocial and antisocial behaviour on children‟s domain scores, while also 
controlling for possible effects of gender and age. However, as outlined below, 
prosocial and antisocial scores were combined to create a single variable, meaning we 
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had three predictors in our model. Field (2009) recommends that at least 40 cases 
(participants) are required to detect large effect sizes when there are three predictors 
in the model. To detect a medium effect, a sample of 80 is recommended when there 
are three predictors. This suggests our data set was powerful enough to detect 
medium-to-strong effects. Preliminary data screening indicated that Moral and 
Conventional scores were both significantly skewed, but for both sets of scores log 
transformations resolved this problem.  
Inclusion of both the prosocial and antisocial nominations in our regression 
analyses (see below) resulted in a problem with multicollinearity (VIF > 3.58). The 
two sets of nominations were highly, negatively correlated (r = -.85, p < 0.001), and 
so we created a single measure by subtracting each child‟s antisocial nominations 
from their prosocial nominations. Higher scores on this measure therefore indicated a 
higher preponderance of prosocial than antisocial nominations, and we refer to this 
new variable as Social Reputation, with higher scores reflecting more prosocial than 
antisocial nominations, and low scores reflecting more antisocial than prosocial 
nominations. 
Correlations between all the main study variables are shown in Table 1. This 
shows that scores on the three domains were not significantly correlated, but that 
higher scores (more prosocial) on the Social Reputation measure were positively 
correlated with Conventional and Moral domain scores and negatively correlated with 
the Personal domain scores. We also checked to see if there were gender differences 
on the study variables by conducting independent t-tests. These indicated that girls 
(mean = 78.67, SD = 30.31) scored significantly higher than boys (mean = 34.41, SD 
= 53.81) on both the Social Reputation measure, t (49) = -3.67, p = .001, and the 
Conventional domain scores (girls: mean = 0.54, SD = 0.26; boys: mean = 0.39, SD = 
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0.25), t (49) = 2.10, p = .041. Boys had significantly higher Personal domain scores 
(mean = 75.29, SD = 23.93) than girls (mean = 62.30, SD = 18.32), t (49) = 2.19, p = 
.033. There were no gender differences on age and Moral domain scores. 
 
Table 1 about here. 
 
Three hierarchical, multiple regressions were conducted, one for each domain 
score (Moral, Conventional, and Personal). Each included age and gender as 
predictors at a first step, followed by the Social Reputation variable at a second step. 
Regarding personal domain scores, step 1 in the regression (including age and gender) 
did not together account for a significant portion of variance (see Table 2). Despite 
the overall model at step 1 being non-significant, gender was a significant individual 
predictor, indicating that boys had higher Personal domain scores than girls. Step 2 in 
the regression accounted for a significant portion of additional variance (9.6%), and 
Social Reputation was negatively related to Personal domain scores, indicating that 
children with more prosocial nominations had lower Personal domain scores. For 
Conventional domain scores, Step 1 did not account for a significant portion of 
variance (see Table 3), though gender was again a significant individual predictor, 
with girls having higher Conventional domain scores than boys. Step 2 in the 
regression did not account for a significant additional portion of variance. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 about here 
 
Finally, for Moral domain scores Step 1 did not account for a significant portion 
of variance. Step 2 did account for a significant portion of additional variance 
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(14.9%). Social Reputation was positively related to Moral domain scores, indicating 
that children with more social reputations had higher Moral domain scores. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Summary 
These results indicate that, after controlling for possible effects of gender and 
age, children‟s Social Reputations are associated with the extent to which they 
attribute peers‟ prosocial behaviour as due to Personal or Moral motives. A higher 
preponderance of prosocial peer-nominations was positively associated with Moral 
motives, but negatively associated with Personal motives. However, Social 
Reputations are not associated with the extent to which children attribute peers‟ 
prosocial behaviour as due to Conventional motives. 
Discussion 
In support of our hypotheses, children who engage in higher levels of 
prosocial behaviour are likely to identify Moral motives for peer prosocial behaviour, 
while those who engage in more antisocial behaviour are likely to identify Personal 
motives. However, we did not find support for the prediction that children who 
engage in higher levels of prosocial behaviour would also be more likely to identify 
Conventional motives for peer prosocial behaviour. Additionally, girls were 
significantly more likely to attribute Conventional motives, and less likely to attribute 
Personal motives, than boys were.  
Our data indicate that, when faced with peers‟ prosocial behaviours, 
„antisocial‟ children are more likely see Personal motives as underlying those 
behaviours. These results are congruent with evidence that antisocial children 
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demonstrate Machiavellian attitudes (Sutton & Keogh, 2000) in as much as they 
suggest that they have a tendency to believe others act prosocially only for relatively 
selfish reasons. Antisocial children, then, perceiving some sort of selfish motive, may 
respond to the prosocial behaviour of others in ways which may be seen as 
inappropriate. Prosocial children, on the other hand, tend to view the prosocial 
behaviours of others as being motivated by moral concerns. This inclination is likely 
to reduce the likelihood that they will consider prosocial behaviour to be enacted for 
anything other than some sort of positive motivation; they would not be likely to 
harbour suspicions about the intentions of others. Therefore, there appears to be scope 
for misinterpretation of prosocial motives by both antisocial and prosocial individuals. 
It appears that whereas prosocial children tend to give others the benefit of the doubt, 
antisocial children tend to be suspicious, and infer ulterior motives to others. Reasons 
for this difference in perception are not clear, but they offer support for the „benign 
attributional bias‟ reported by Nelson and Crick (1999). We cannot say whether 
prosocial behaviour of prosocial and antisocial children themselves is actually 
motivated by different concerns, but it may be possible that children transfer their 
own motives to their perceptions of the motives of others. 
Our results also relate to the notion that aggressive children display deficits 
and biases in their social information processing (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Viewing 
moral domain-specific processing in this way, our results suggest that children who 
engage in lots of antisocial activity may be too quick to interpret the prosocial 
behaviour of peers as due to Personal motives, and too slow to view it as due to Moral 
motives. According to the social information processing model (e.g., Harvey et al., 
2001; Fontaine, 2008), this deficit may then result in inappropriate and unwarranted 
aggressive behaviour towards unsuspecting peers.  
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However, in the vignettes used in our study, the „Personal‟ motives were 
limited in that they all described the fictional child as wishing to be popular or chosen 
as someone‟s friend. As noted earlier, the Personal domain involves a wide range of 
considerations motivated by personal discretion (Nucci, 2001) and so our measure 
may have been somewhat limited in focus. Antisocial children‟s focus on issues 
relating to popularity and friendship may thus reflect their documented rejection from 
the peer group (Denham et al., 1990; Volling et al., 1993) and the motivations behind 
their own attempts to interact positively with others. Perhaps this keen desire to be 
accepted results in clumsy attempts at engaging with peers and, when these fail, 
antisocial children resort or return to what they are most able at, i.e., aggressive and 
antisocial behaviour (Erdley & Asher, 1996). Support for such a possibility comes 
from work showing that children who have moderate or high levels of stable 
aggression in childhood also have poor social skills (Campbell, Spieker, Burchinal, 
Poe, & The NICHD Early Child Care Research Network, 2006), and are easily 
frustrated (Shields & Cicchetti, 1998). To explore such a possibility, future research 
should examine whether a tendency toward making personal domain judgements 
relating to social behaviour is also related to children‟s social skills. 
It is also notable that the more prosocial children actively preferred Moral 
motives. Hence, prosocial children seem to believe that peers act prosocially because 
those peers view the outcomes of such prosocial behaviour to be universally and 
intrinsically positive, rather than because they seek to gain some personal reward 
from the prosocial behaviour. Again, it may be suggested that prosocial and antisocial 
children both transfer their own motives to the ways in which they perceive the 
motives of others. Indeed, it is claimed (Sutton, Reeves, & Keogh, 2000) that poor 
theory of mind performance in antisocial children is correlated with lack of remorse. 
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This would suggest that antisocial children are less well-equipped to understand the 
needs and motivations of others. However, Arsenio and Lemerise (2001) argue that 
while aggressive children are variously seen as „social inadequates‟ or as 
„Machiavellian schemers‟, individual differences in emotion processes such as 
emotionality and emotion regulation may also contribute to differences found in 
empathy and social information processing skills of aggressive children. The findings 
of the current study highlight the importance of the claim of Arsenio and Lemerise 
(2001), that aggressive behaviour has traditionally been viewed as value-free, as the 
results suggest that children‟s behaviour which results in positive outcomes for others 
may be motivated by different values, not all of which are altruistic.  
Future research and limitations 
The current research has focused on perceptions of the prosocial motives of 
others, but an important line of future study is to investigate how prosocial and 
antisocial children evaluate their own motives for prosocial behaviour. Insight gained 
from this type of inquiry could inform the development of future intervention 
strategies designed to improve children‟s effective social functioning. A typical 
intervention strategy, for example, could be to help prosocial and antisocial children 
understand that peers may not share their perceptions of the motives of others. 
Lemerise and Arsenio (2000) have identified the importance of integrating research 
on the effects of emotionality and regulation (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Eisenberg et 
al., 1997; Hubbard & Coie, 1994; Saarni, 1999) and cognitive decision-making (Crick 
& Dodge, 1994; Dodge, Pettit, McClaskey, & Brown, 1986) to children‟s social 
competence. Alluding to Turiel (1983), Arsenio and Lemerise (2001) have also raised 
the question of whether social competence can ever be regarded as „value-free‟, and 
subsequently claim that in order to understand bullying and social competence, it is 
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necessary to refer to traditional moral issues, such as fairness, the welfare of others, 
and avoiding personal reward gained through actions which may harm others. The 
findings of the current study help to support the stance (Arsenio & Lemerise, 2001) 
that individuals‟ differing values are important in children‟s decisions to act 
prosocially. It would appear that intervention strategies which aim to reduce levels of 
children‟s antisocial behaviour should address questions such as shared and differing 
understanding of what is acceptable and unacceptable, and the negative consequences, 
to both individual and society, which may be suffered as a result of antisocial 
behaviour. 
Future studies should also aim to consider these issues with larger sample 
sizes as the present sample was not large enough to detect small effect sizes. Our 
hypothesis that prosocial children would be more likely to identify Conventional 
motives which was not supported, though it was notable that in the relevant regression 
the association between Social Reputation and Conventional motives was in the 
expected direction (standardized beta = .24) and Social Reputation accounted for 
4.5% of the variance in this motive. We therefore have confidence in our significant 
results, but are more tentative with regards to how conclusive our non-significant 
results are. 
Given the scope of our measure relating to the personal domain (i.e., focussing 
on popularity and/or friendship building), future research should also aim to develop 
measure which more comprehensively capture the nuanced nature of cognitions 
relevant to this domain (c.f., Nucci, 2001).  
Conclusions 
 Although stage theories of prosocial and moral reasoning provide a very 
helpful framework, useful for understanding the development of the capacity of 
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prosocial and moral reasoning, they do not address individual decisions regarding the 
choice to act, or not to act, in a prosocial manner. Domain theory (Turiel, 1978, 
Nucci, 1981) is fundamental in explaining situational differences shown by 
individuals, but does not address the differences in judgments made by prosocial and 
antisocial individuals. The findings of this study not only support the idea that 
children engage in social reasoning in separate domains (Turiel, 1978, Nucci, 1981), 
but also show that peer-nominated prosocial and antisocial children perceive their 
peer prosocial motives differently. This study has revealed important relationships 
between the extent to which children are pro- or antisocial and the ways in which they 
judge peers‟ prosocial actions. Antisocial children tend to attribute Personal motives 
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 The authors acknowledge that, apart from in the most extreme cases, most 
children will engage in both prosocial and antisocial behaviour. In the current paper, 
the use of the terms „prosocial‟ and antisocial‟ does not indicate that children have 
been formally or clinically classified as being either prosocial or antisocial.  Rather, 
the children involved in the current study were identified by their peers as being more 




Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Main Study Variables. 
 2 3 4 5 Mean (SD) 
1. Age in Months
 
-.06 .01 -.13 .13 137.47 (4.63) 
2. Social Reputation - -.42** .34* .40** 57.84 (48.03) 





  - .23 0.47 (0.26) 
5. Moral Domain
1 
   - 0.48 (0.27) 
 
1
Log transformed scores.  




Regression Analysis Predicting Personal Domain Scores from Gender, Age, and 
Social Reputation Score. 









F (2,48) = 2.38, p = .103, R
2
 = .090 
2  Social Reputation  -.35* 
Fchange (1,47) = 5.55, p = .023, R
2
change = .096 
a
Gender coded (1 = male; 2 = female) 
* p < 0.05. 
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Table 3. 
Regression Analysis Predicting Conventional Domain Scores from Gender, Age, and 
Social Reputation Score. 









F (2,47) = 2.83, p = .069, R
2
 = .108 
2  Social Reputation  .24 
Fchange (1,46) = 2.45, p = .045, R
2
change = .045 
a
Gender coded (1 = male; 2 = female) 
* p < 0.05. 
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Table 4. 
Regression Analysis Predicting Moral Domain Scores from Gender, Age, and 
Social Reputation Score. 









F (2,47) = 0.851, p = .434, R
2
 = .035 
2  Social Reputation  .44** 
Fchange (1,46) = 8.42, p = .006, R
2
change = .149 
a
Gender coded (1 = male; 2 = female). 
 ** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
